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Martha Kneale on why metaphysical necessities are not a priori 
 
Abstract 
In her 1938 paper, “Logical and Metaphysical Necessity”, Martha Kneale introduces 
the necessary a posteriori. I present a critical summary of Kneale’s argument that so-
called ‘metaphysical propositions’ are necessary but not a priori. I argue that Kneale 
is well-placed to offer a template for reconciling conceivability approaches to modal 
epistemology with the post-Kripkean trend for taking metaphysical necessities to 
have their source in mind-independent reality. 
 
Keywords: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Necessary a posteriori, Philosophy of logic, 
History of philosophy 
 
1. A simple story 
Can we know all metaphysical necessities a priori, or are some (or all) only knowable 
a posteriori? There is a familiar, simplified story of the changing answers to this 
question throughout the twentieth century.1 That story goes something like this. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the philosophical school of Logical 
Empiricism was a guiding force.2 According to the received wisdom, necessity, 
analyticity, and a priority go hand-in-hand. Something is necessarily true if, and only 
if, it is true in virtue of its meaning, and we can therefore know all and only such 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., section 1.1 of the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on “The Epistemology of 
Modality” (Vaidya 2017). See also, e.g., Ney (2014: 210), Bird (2010: 125-6). 
2 See, e.g., Ayer (1936), Wittgenstein (1921, 1974) and “Wissenschaftliche 
Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis,” (Stadler and Uebel 2012). 
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truths a priori, via our knowledge of the meaning of the words expressing them. Such 
truths (and knowledge) are clearly distinguished from empirical fact (and empirical 
knowledge). To know – even to grasp – empirical truths, we need particular 
experience of the world. As the century wore on, philosophy grew away from Logical 
Empiricism, but this assumption concerning the co-extension of necessity, analyticity 
and a priority remained largely unchallenged (except for a challenge to the very 
legitimacy of those notions, which itself arguably trades on their coextension (Quine 
1951, 1953)). Then, in January 1970, a revolution was started. Saul Kripke gave 
three lectures at Princeton University, later published as Naming and Necessity. 
Amongst other things, in these lectures Kripke argues that some (metaphysical) 
necessities are knowable only a posteriori. This was a tremendous watershed 
moment in the history of philosophy in general, and the history of logic and 
metaphysics in particular. From that time onwards, the general consensus has been 
that Kripke is right, or that disagreement warrants serious engagement with his 
arguments. Metaphysical necessity is one thing, the a priori is another, and they only 
overlap partially, if at all.  
The story corresponds to a changing conception of the nature and source of 
metaphysical necessity. Given this changing picture, it is difficult to characterise 
metaphysical necessity in neutral terms. At least, metaphysical necessity is a variety 
of alethic necessity: if it is metaphysically necessary that p then p. It is typically taken 
to be absolute – if it is metaphysically necessary that p, then for any alethic sense of 
‘necessary’, it is necessary that p in that sense. The starting point of our simple story 
goes naturally with a kind of conventionalism about necessity: necessity is not 
merely co-extensive with analyticity, but has its source in analyticity, which in turn 
depends upon linguistic convention. As such, given that one can know analytic truths 
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a priori by conceptual analysis, one is guaranteed a priori knowledge of necessities. 
If one instead takes metaphysical necessity to have its source in worldly – non-
representational – things, as is now more common – then the link to analyticity and a 
priority seems obviously weakened. Hence, nowadays metaphysical necessity is 
sometimes even defined as also being synthetic and/or a posteriori (e.g. Rosen 
2006: 15-16). 
This is a simplified story, and simplified stories are usually incorrect in all sorts 
of ways. The present aim is to raise one particular challenge to this story, centring on 
a paper, “Logical and Metaphysical Necessity”, presented by Martha Kneale at the 
Aristotelian Society in London, June 1938. In that paper, Kneale introduces the 
necessary a posteriori. Hence, already in the 1930s there is a serious challenge to 
the co-extension of necessity and a priority. 
I proceed as follows. First, I present a critical account of Kneale’s argument 
that so-called ‘metaphysical propositions’ are necessary but not a priori. I then move 
on to compare Kneale and Kripke. I argue that there are important and interesting 
similarities between the two. Both reject a certain kind of linguistic account of 
metaphysical necessities, which leads them, one way or another, to conclude that 
such necessities are not a priori. Both appeal to aspects of the world to explain these 
necessities, and why we need empirical experience to discover them. Moreover – 
perhaps surprisingly – both appear to endorse a Conceivability Principle. I’ll argue 
that Kneale is better-placed to defend the use of such a principle, and as such, offers 
a template for a reconciliation of conceivability approaches to modal epistemology 
with the post-Kripkean trend for taking metaphysical necessities to have their source 




2. Metaphysical propositions 
Kneale’s discussion centres on an important class of propositions: metaphysical 
propositions. First, let me briefly sketch the framework that emerges throughout the 
paper. Propositions can be true or false, necessary, possible, or impossible. 
Sentences can also be true or false, necessarily or possibly true etc., and they 
express propositions (see Kneale 1938: 258-61). I assume, then, that the alethic and 
modal properties of sentences are inherited from the propositions they express. 
Propositions can state facts (Kneale 1938: 266).  
Kneale asks: 
 
Are there metaphysically necessary propositions and, if so, which are they 
and how are they to be distinguished from other necessary propositions, e.g., 
logically necessary propositions? (Kneale 1938: 253) 
 
This question arises due to a fallacy of equivocation over modal terms that Kneale 
diagnoses as afflicting the master argument of Diodorus Cronus, the details of which 
will not concern us here (Kneale 1938: 253). She then introduces metaphysical 
propositions.   
 
Metaphysical propositions are distinguished from empirical propositions by the 
fact that they are necessary, i.e., their contradictories are inconceivable and 
from logical propositions by the fact that they are synthetic, i.e., their 




They are metaphysical because they are concerned with the most general 
characteristics of reality. 
 
I think they may justifiably be called metaphysical, for if there is a science 
which is concerned with the most general characteristics of reality and the 
necessary relations between them, these propositions belong to it. And such a 
science has traditionally been called metaphysics. (Kneale 1938: 264) 
 
 Let us pause to consider the first point: that metaphysical propositions are 
necessary. Necessity is equated with inconceivability (Kneale 1938: 263).  Rather 
than directly appeal to a connection between possibility and conceivability, Kneale 
draws a connection between necessity and the inconceivability of the opposite. This 
resembles what Crispin Wright has called the Counter-Conceivability Principle (see 
also Wright 2002).  
 
If one has what at least appears to be a lucid, detailed conception of how it 
might be that not P, then that should count as a good, albeit defeasible 
ground for its being possible that not P, and hence its not being necessary 
that P, whatever the subject matter of P. (Wright 2018: 268) 
 
Such a principle is a special case of the standard conceivability principle – if it is 
conceivable that p then it is possible that p – where p is of the form not-q. But it 
draws out the particular relevance of conceivability for claims of metaphysical 
necessity. For it follows, by contraposition, that if it is impossible that not-q 
(necessary that q), then it is inconceivable that not-q. 
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We might question why metaphysical necessity should be allied to such a 
principle. For, isn’t the point precisely that metaphysical necessity runs free of our 
conceptual resources, in which case, a Counter-Conceivability Principle should 
provide no guide to metaphysical necessity at all? Indeed, I argue below that 
Kneale’s account of metaphysically necessary propositions, and how we can know 
them, still draws on a connection to our grasp of their meaning, but their meaning 
bears an important relation to the empirical facts, hence Kneale has the resources to 
defend her commitment to a conceivability principle.  
What are Kneale’s examples of metaphysical propositions? Kneale begins 
with a discussion of rules for tense (partly to illuminate the necessity of the past 
implicated in the Master Argument.) She presents the rules in two different ways, 
depending on whether one takes tense to reside in the sentences expressing at 
different times tenseless propositions, or whether one allows the propositions 
themselves to be tensed. For example, under the first view, that ‘all propositions are 
true and false and do not change their truth-values’ and ‘the same proposition is at 
different times appropriately or correctly expressible by different sentences’ (261): 
 
Rule 1.—The standard sentence [“There is (timeless) at least one A.”] entails 
a disjunction of sentences, i.e., either there was an A or there is an A or there 
will be an A. … 
 
Rule 4.—If any sentence of the form, “There was an A” is at any moment the 
correct expression of a true proposition, an exactly similar sentence will be at 
all succeeding moments the correct expression of a true proposition.   




Under the second view, according to which ‘tense and the other elements mentioned 
above are part of the structure of some historical propositions’ (262), we have the 
corresponding rules: 
 
Rule 1.—If a standard proposition of the form “There is at least one A” is true, 
it follows that at any given moment one of the following propositions is true; 
“There will be an A,” “There is an A,” “There was an A.” 
 
Rule 4.—If any proposition of the form, ‘There was an A’ is at any moment 
true, it follows that the same proposition will be true at all succeeding 
moments. 
(Kneale 1938: 263) 
 
It is plausible that the contradictories of these rules are not self-contradictory.  
 
We cannot imagine a language which uses tenses at all in which these rules 
concerning tenses do not apply, or, to state this without reference to 
language, we cannot imagine a universe which is temporal at all in which 
these propositions concerning the truth and falsity of propositions about the 
past, present and future are not true. 
 But these propositions do not seem to be necessary in the sense of 
being analytic. As far as I can see, their contradictories are not self-
contradictory. “‘There was an A’ is true and will be false,” does not seem to be 
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self-contradictory in the way in which “‘There was an A’ is both true and false” 
is. (Kneale 1938: 263) 
 
Claims about imaginative ability aside, it seems plausible that part of the nature of 
temporality is some kind of linear ordering of past, present and future. And although 
these temporal features are encoded pretty effectively into tensed language, it isn’t 
at all clear that impossible combinations of tense – as in Kneale’s example – yield 
formal contradictions. Let us then, for present purposes, grant these examples. 
Further examples are ‘propositions concerning spatial inclusion and betweenness’ 
and ‘propositions concerning the relations between colours and similar propositions 
concerning the relations between other sensory qualities of the same range’ (Kneale 
1938: 266), such as ‘red is more like pink than it is like yellow’.  
Kneale connects these cases to Isaiah Berlin’s discussion of ostensive 
definitions, presented the previous year at the Aristotelian Society. The background 
consensus at the time was that meaningful propositions are either tautologies or 
empirical propositions. The former are necessary, analytic and a priori, the latter 
contingent, synthetic, and a posteriori. There is also agreement that the 
contradictories of logically necessary propositions are self-contradictory, that 
logically necessary propositions are a priori, and that logical truth and analytic truth 
are to be understood in terms of linguistic convention. Berlin aimed to show that 
there are a priori propositions other than those whose contradictories are self-
contradictory, i.e., other than analytic or logical truths. 
Of course, Berlin’s and Kneale’s were not the only voices of dissent at the 
time. See, for example, Ewing’s (1940) blistering attack on conventionalist theories 
of the a priori. I do not have space for a thorough review of all such dissent here. But 
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it is worth stressing that whilst others, such as Berlin and Ewing, challenged links 
between a priority and analyticity, Kneale stands apart by challenging the link 
between a priority and necessity. Hence, my focus here is her contribution. 
Berlin distinguishes between verbal and ostensive definition. Verbal definition 
defines a symbol conventionally in terms of other words, for example, defining 
“bachelor” to mean “unmarried man”. Ostensive definition defines a symbol by 
association with something presented, ‘i.e. a symbolic expression is attached to a 
characteristic given in experience or to a combination of such characteristics whose 
instances it then classifies’ (Berlin 1937: 73). For example, defining “scarlet” by 
pointing at a particular patch of colour.3 Berlin argues that verbal definition depends, 
at bottom, upon ostensive definition (1937: 71-2). As Schlick put the same point: 
 
It is clear that in order to understand a verbal definition we must know the 
signification of the explaining words beforehand, and that the only explanation 
which can work without any previous knowledge is the ostensive definition. 
We conclude that there is no way of understanding any meaning without 
ultimate reference to ostensive definitions. (Schlick 1936: 342) 
 
 Such a view is a kind of verificationist logical atomism, according to which words 
and their propositional correlates can be analysed until they bottom out in atoms that 
are directly related to the world. This is not plausible globally, for we must explain 
how a practice of ostensive definition could get off the ground in the absence of any 
                                                          
3 See also Schlick (1936: 341). This distinction was discussed, less favourably, by 
Wittgenstein in his 1933-34 lectures (Blue Book, 1964, 1).  
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meaningful means of communication. However, Kneale’s argument below only 
requires the weaker claim that in some important cases terms have an ostensive 
definition. 
 With this notion of ostensive definition in place, Berlin claims that, just as 
there is truth in virtue of meaning arising from linguistic convention, so there can be 
truth in virtue of ostensive meaning. He argues that we are presented not only with 
features but also with relations between them. As such, there are propositions 
concerning the relations between features that are true in virtue of their ostensive 
definition – true in virtue of the meaning they acquire from direct presentation in 
experience (that is: the sentences expressing those propositions are true in virtue of 
ostensive definition). Such a proposition, 
 
asserts some relation between empirical characteristics or universals which is 
necessary, but not rendered so by definition: for instance, 'this pink (shade) is 
more like this vermilion than it is like this black',… where pink, vermilion, 
black,… 'more like',… are or could be defined ostensively, i.e. by pointing. 
One perceived instance of such complexes suffices to demonstrate that all 
past or future instances of the constituent universals are related by the same 
relation as those in the given instance… The logical relation of the colour 
names are determined by the order of the shades in a scale or series which is 
itself directly perceived or 'given'. (Berlin 1937: 76) 
 
Berlin contends that sentences purporting to express the contradictories of such 
propositions are not self-contradictory, hence these propositions are not logical or 
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analytic truths. But he takes the contradictories of these propositions to be 
inconceivable, hence these propositions to be necessary.  
Such examples resemble Kneale’s metaphysical propositions. They are 
necessary yet not logically necessary, and they arguably concern ‘the most general 
characteristics of reality and the necessary relations between them’. The meanings 
of the constituents of these propositions are taken to arise from a direct relation to 
features of the empirical world. Temporal and spatial relations, and sensory qualities 
such as colour are, it is claimed, given directly in experience, and terms for them are 
not definable verbally or via linguistic conventions. There may be a convention to use 
the symbol ‘will’ rather than ‘was’ for future tense, but the thought is that the relations 
between future, present and past tenses, whatever symbols we use for them, are 
given to us in experience.  
This provides a candidate explanation for the inconceivability of the 
contradictories of metaphysical propositions: they go against the meanings of their 
constituents. The meanings of the terms are fixed by a relation to empirical reality – 
including not only the features associated with each term (e.g. a particular shade 
with “scarlet”), but also the relations between different features (e.g. that scarlet is 
more like pink than yellow). As such, to conceive of the opposite (e.g., that scarlet is 
more like yellow than pink) is in violation of the very meanings of the terms. But then, 
how can we conceive of such a scenario at all? It would be like trying to conceive of 
a married bachelor.  
There are other reasons to think that we fully understand propositions about 
colour only by having some direct colour experience. For example, a similar idea 
was famously developed by Jackson (1986): Mary is missing something in her 
knowledge of redness if she doesn’t leave her grayscale room to see some red 
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things. Nevertheless, one might puzzle over the additional claim that facts about 
certain relations between colours are also thereby presented in experience. Is it 
really through direct experience that we come to know that red is more like pink than 
yellow? Could we not come to know each colour independently, and then 
subsequently infer or otherwise work out – independent of a particular colour 
experience, and in addition to the experiences in which we acquire our knowledge of 
the individual colours – the relations between them? Kneale and Berlin do not 
discuss this worry, but it seems to me that there is a reasonable response. On their 
view, the meanings of these colour terms are not subject to analysis – they have 
ostensive, not verbal, definitions. Hence, they do not have the kind of structure that 
would be amenable to a certain kind of inferential connection between them. For 
example, one could not argue: pink is defined as a mixture of white and red; yellow is 
primitive; so red is more like pink than yellow because red is part of pink and not of 
yellow. If we cannot work out colour relations by this kind of inference, the alternative 
would seem to be that we have to see them. If you’ve seen red, pink and yellow, the 
thought goes, you must also have seen – even if you didn’t explicitly realise it at the 
time – that red is more like pink than yellow. That’s just part of what it is to 
understand what red, pink and yellow are.  
I think this is a plausible line of argument for metaphysical propositions 
concerning ranges of sensory qualities. I am less sure how to extend it to temporal 
and spatial structures. One option might be to draw on Kant’s arguments (in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason) that our most basic 
representations of space and time are not concepts but ‘intuitions’: singular, 
immediate representations of things. Such representations are not subject to 
conceptual analysis, and structural features of space and time are thereby presented 
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to us wholesale, with our initial presentation of space and time themselves. Such a 
view, however, if to be of use to Kneale, would need to be disentangled from Kant’s 
other claim that these representations are not derived from sense experience and 
give rise to a priori knowledge of the structures of space and time. 
 
3. Kneale’s argument: why metaphysical propositions are not a priori. 
Metaphysical propositions, let us allow, are metaphysically but not logically 
necessary. Kneale seeks a further characterisation of them, which renders them 
knowable only a posteriori.  
 The line of argument goes via the contradictories of metaphysical 
propositions. What are we to make of them? Berlin proposed that they are 
meaningless, and hence that metaphysical propositions (propositions true in virtue of 
ostensive meaning) are a priori.  
 
[I]nvited to conceive of a world in which the shades we call pink, red, black, 
occurred in some order other than that presented in ours, we must say that 
we cannot do so: not because of a failure of imagination but, because it is 
inconceivable: the invitation is itself nonsensical … But if the contradictories of 
these are neither self-contradictory, nor straightforwardly false, what are they? 
We can only answer that they seem meaningless. Meaningless not because 
they offend against the rules of a particular language, for they conform to 
them: but, because while they appear to state something, what they state is, 




For Berlin, we don’t need empirical verification of metaphysical propositions, 
because it doesn’t even make sense to suppose that they are false. Whilst Berlin 
does challenge the equivalence of necessity and a priority on the one hand, and 
analyticity on the other, he retains the equivalence of necessity and a priority.  
 On the contrary, Kneale argues that the contradictories of metaphysical 
propositions are not meaningless. 
 
For it seems to me that we must know what a proposition means before we 
can know that it is necessarily false, just as we know what it means before we 
can know that it is self-contradictory. (Kneale 1938: 264) 
 
I find this point utterly convincing and have argued the case for contradictions at 
more length elsewhere (Leech 2015). Whilst such propositions, or the sentences 
expressing them, may violate the meanings of their constituents, hence explaining 
their inconceivability, we still know the meanings of those constituents, and they are 
still put together in a grammatical way. 
 Kneale’s discussion of the next option leads us into the core of her argument. 
She argues against the suggestion that the contradictories of metaphysical 
propositions are a priori inapplicable. In her framework, applicability is a matter of 
exemplification in empirical reality; a proposition is exemplified in empirical reality 
just when its terms are instantiated in empirical reality and it is true. One might think 
that applicability should only be a matter of whether the terms of the proposition are 
instantiated, not whether the proposition is true. However, the condition of truth is 
required to make sense of why one might take the contradictories of metaphysical 
propositions to be inapplicable, e.g. that red is more like yellow than pink; for the 
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terms of such a proposition are instantiated, even though as a whole it is necessarily 
false. A proposition is a priori applicable, then, just when it is a priori, and hence 
necessary, that it is exemplified in empirical reality. (Only the direction from necessity 
to a priority is challenged here, not that from a priority to necessity, so we can allow 
the move from a priority to necessity.) A proposition is a priori inapplicable just when 
it is a priori that the proposition is not exemplified in empirical reality. Kneale also 
assumes that a proposition p is a priori applicable if and only if the contradictory of p 
is a priori inapplicable. Finally, a proposition is existential just when the proposition 
entails whether or not its terms are instantiated (Kneale 1938: 264-5). 
How does a priori applicability relate to a priori knowledge? If it is a priori 
applicable that p, then it is a priori that the terms of p are instantiated and p is true. If 
it is – as follows – a priori that p is true, this is tantamount to the a priori knowability 
of p. So, a priori applicability entails a priori knowability. It is unclear whether the 
reverse entailment holds, for one might think there could be cases where one could 
know a priori that p but not know a priori that the terms of p are instantiated, but I 
shall set this question to one side, as it is not crucial for the argument that follows.4  
For Kneale, logical propositions are a priori applicable, 
  
for whatever kind of universe may be conceived, it must be described by one 
or more true propositions and it will be true that these propositions cannot be 
both true and false and that they must be false, if they are not true. (Kneale 
1938: 265) 
 
                                                          
4 Perhaps a priori truths concerning very big numbers in a universe of unknown size. 
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Her point is not merely that logical truths would be true no matter what, but that their 
terms would be instantiated. If logical truths are about propositions – e.g. no 
proposition can be both truth and false – then the term ‘proposition’ would always 
have application, because no matter what, there would be propositions describing 
how things are. 
 However, Kneale argues, metaphysical propositions are different. The first 
step of her argument is supposed to establish that all known metaphysical 
propositions contain, besides logical constituents, only constituents ‘with which we 
have direct acquaintance in empirical reality’ (Kneale 1938, 265). This is presented 
as following from the fact that metaphysical propositions are synthetic.  
 
[A]ll the metaphysical propositions we know do have exemplification in 
empirical reality and this must be so because, since metaphysical 
propositions are synthetic, their terms must be understood apart from the 
propositions if the propositions are to be known. For if the constituents of 
these propositions could be defined in terms of each other, the propositions 
concerning their relations would be analytic. Consequently, all the 
metaphysical propositions which we know contain besides logical constituents 
only constituents with which we have direct acquaintance in empirical reality. 
(Kneale 1938: 265) 
 
Why conclude that we have direct acquaintance with the non-logical constituents of 
metaphysical propositions as exemplified in empirical reality, just because they are 
synthetic? One might suppose that the constituents of a synthetic proposition could 
be given verbal definitions elsewhere, and then be combined into a meaningful, 
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synthetic proposition. For example, plausibly, I can know that Jimmy is a bachelor 
without needing direct acquaintance with some property of bachelorhood (perhaps 
without needing direct acquaintance with Jimmy). However, how could one account 
for the necessity of a synthetic proposition with ostensively-defined constituents, or 
for the inconceivability of its contradictory? As there is no deep connection between 
the definitions, and no contradiction in putting together the constituents of the 
contradictory, it is hard to see where any necessity could arise from in the former 
case, or incompatibility in the latter case. The thought seems to be that if we are to 
find another kind of incompatibility, besides contradiction, we will not find it in the 
words and their definitions, but in the things our words are about or express, hence, 
in the things with which we have direct acquaintance. Indeed, Kneale suggests this 
move from linguistic rules to the things our words are about when she writes of the 
tense rules that 
 
Even though the rules may be expressed in linguistic form … they do not 
express primarily our determination to use “was”, “is” and “will be” in 
accordance with the rules, but the fact that, since we use them as we do, the 
relations between sentences containing them must be so and that whatever 
expressions we choose to use as equivalent to “was”, “is” and “will be,” 
respectively, the rules governing their use must be the same. (Kneale 1938: 
263-4) 
 
The terms expressing non-logical constituents of metaphysical propositions must be 
understood via direct acquaintance with the things to which they apply in empirical 
reality, so these terms have an ostensive, not a verbal, definition. 
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 The above draws out that, for Kneale, there are constituents of propositions 
with which we have direct acquaintance in empirical reality. This suggests that she 
has a Russellian conception of propositions – propositions are constituted from 
worldly things, objects and properties, say, rather than abstract or mental 
representations of worldly things. Indeed, this may help us to make sense of the 
terms of a proposition having ‘instantiation’. One usually thinks of properties as the 
kinds of things to be instantiated. If properties themselves are constituents of 
propositions, then it makes straightforward sense that the terms of a proposition may 
be instantiated or not. What this does then commit Kneale to is the existence of 
uninstantiated properties; for, we shall see, she allows that there can be propositions 
containing uninstantiated terms. 
 The second step of Kneale’s argument purports to show that, therefore, 
metaphysical propositions are not a priori applicable. For they are also not 
existential.  
 
metaphysical propositions are not existential. They do not themselves entail 
anything about the instantiation of their terms. (Kneale 1938: 265) 
 
Metaphysical propositions concern general, structural facts about the world, and 
general statements are not existentially-committing. To take Kneale’s examples, 
general rules for tensed propositions or sentences do not require, or preclude, the 
existence of any such propositions or sentences; and general propositions 
concerning the structure of the colour spectrum do not require or preclude anything 
actually being coloured. As metaphysical propositions are not existential, they can be 
true without their terms being instantiated in empirical reality (here arises the 
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commitment to uninstantiated properties.) Kneale argues that, therefore, it is 
possible that there are true yet unknown metaphysical propositions. If we need direct 
acquaintance with the referents of the constituents of a metaphysical proposition in 
order to understand it, but if its constituents are not instantiated in empirical reality, 
then we could not understand the proposition, let alone know it. Nevertheless, as a 
non-existential proposition, it could still be true. 
 Kneale presents two ways in which metaphysical propositions may be true 
and unknown. 
 
It seems possible, therefore, that there may be true metaphysical 
propositions, the terms of which have no instantiation and about which, 
therefore, we know nothing. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the 
terms of the metaphysical propositions we do know should not have 
instantiation. In that case the metaphysical propositions might be said to have 
no application. For example … in a universe in which there was no colour, Mr. 
Berlin's metaphysical propositions about the relations of colour would have no 
application. (Kneale 1938: 265) 
 
(1) It is possible that there are true metaphysical propositions that are not 
exemplified in empirical reality, hence, possible that there are true metaphysical 
propositions that we do not know. (2) Of the metaphysical propositions we do know, 
it is possible that they might not have been exemplified in empirical reality, and 
hence possible that we didn’t know them.  
Finally then, we cannot know independent of experience which metaphysical 
propositions are exemplified in empirical reality – for that we need direct 
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acquaintance with their constituents. That is, we need particular empirical 
experience. So metaphysical propositions are not a priori applicable. The same 
argument seems also to show that metaphysical propositions are not knowable a 
priori, but rather only knowable empirically, if at all. For we need direct acquaintance 
with – particular empirical experience of – what the metaphysical propositions are 
about to be able to understand and know them. 
One can find a similar point, briefly put, in Kneale’s later work:  
 
No doubt every proposition which is analytically true can be known a priori 
and every proposition which can be known a priori is necessary. But it is by no 
means obvious that the converse relations hold. … it is at least conceivable 
that there are [necessary truths (i.e. truths without alternatives) which we 
cannot know a priori]. We commonly admit that there are truths of 
mathematics which no one in fact knows, and it does not seem absurd to 
suggest that there may be necessary truths about unperceived qualities or 
relations which no human being can ever know because (as Locke might say) 
none has the requisite ideas. (Kneale and Kneale 1962: 637). 
 
In response, whilst one may grant that we need particular empirical 
experiences to acquire certain (perhaps all) concepts, one could still deny that all 
propositions containing these concepts are thereby knowable only a posteriori. For 
example, we might grant that the concept red can only be properly acquired through 
experience of red things, but still suppose that a proposition such as red is a colour 
is a priori. Is Kneale making such a mistake – confusing conditions of concept 
acquisition with the kind of knowledge one can have of propositions involving such 
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concepts once acquired? On the contrary, her claim is not that any proposition 
containing ostensively-defined constituents must be a posteriori, but rather a special 
class of propositions: necessary, synthetic propositions about the general structure 
of the world. So, although our grasp of red is a colour may require a certain kind of 
experience, in order to acquire the concept red, this is not obviously a metaphysical 
proposition in Kneale’s sense, for it does not concern a structural relation between 
colours. 
Nevertheless, metaphysical propositions might yet appear a priori. Kneale 
discusses a class of propositions which are such that if one is in a position to 
understand them, one is also thereby in a position to know them. Surely this is a 
priori if anything is.5  
Again, I think this is to misunderstand Kneale. Let us take a priority to be a 
matter of knowability without the requirement for particular empirical confirmation, 
and the a posteriori to require particular empirical confirmation. So, for example, one 
cannot know that grass is green without a particular kind of empirical confirmation 
(e.g. seeing grass under ordinary conditions) but one can know that 2+2=4, without 
particular empirical confirmation. 
At this point, I find Williamson’s distinction between evidential and enabling 
roles of experience to be helpful. Roughly: experience plays an evidential role in 
knowledge that p if it provides evidence for believing that p; it plays an enabling role 
if it provides the opportunity to acquire concepts required to grasp p.  
 
Experience is held to play an evidential role in my visual knowledge that this 
shirt is green, but a merely enabling role in my visual knowledge that all green 
                                                          
5 Thank you to Bill Brewer for raising this point. 
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things are coloured: I needed it only to acquire the concepts green and 
coloured, without which I could not even raise the question whether all green 
things are coloured. (Williamson 2007: 165) 
 
A priori knowledge is standardly taken, Williamson explains, to be incompatible with 
an evidential, and compatible with an enabling, role for experience. Hence, 
experience is usually taken to be merely enabling in cases of a priori knowledge, and 
strictly evidential in cases of a posteriori knowledge. 
Consider Kneale’s metaphysical propositions. In order to be in a position to 
grasp them, one must have particular empirical experiences, hence, experience 
plays an enabling role. But it does not play a merely enabling role; the experience 
also provides the exact kind of empirical confirmation required for a posteriori 
knowledge of these propositions. These propositions are known by empirical 
experience already in the kind of experience that is required for us to grasp them. 
One might put the point: in such cases, the experience is a common cause of both 
concept possession and knowledge. So yes, metaphysical propositions resemble the 
a priori, because if one is in a position to grasp them, one is also thereby in a 
position to know them. But they also resemble the a posteriori because it is only 
possible to know them through particular empirical confirmation. The reason why this 
is so does, admittedly, seem rather different to standard cases of the a posteriori. 
But it is also importantly different to standard cases of the a priori. At worst, we might 
best understand Kneale as having found a class of cases that cast doubt on the 
exhaustiveness of this distinction. 
Indeed, this is reminiscent of Williamson’s discussion of whether certain kinds 
of counterfactual judgment – including the kind that gives us knowledge of 
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metaphysical modality – are a priori or a posteriori (Williamson 2007:165ff). Given an 
understanding of a priori knowledge according to which it is incompatible with an 
evidential, and compatible with an enabling, role for experience, it is unclear, for 
Williamson, how to classify the kind of knowledge of counterfactuals that he takes to 
be based in the imagination. For whilst experience does not play an obviously 
evidential role in cases of such knowledge, it also seems to be playing more than a 
merely enabling role. In brief, past experience is taken to feed into our capacity to 
appropriately imagine various scenarios on the basis of which to make 
counterfactual judgments. Ultimately, Williamson suggests that the distinction 
between a priori and a posteriori is ‘handy enough for a rough initial description of 
epistemic phenomena’, but ‘out of place in a deeper theoretical analysis, because it 
obscures more significant epistemic patterns’ (2007: 169). He favours the 
introduction of a category of ‘armchair knowledge’ into which modal knowledge may 
fall. 
 One might take Kneale, like Williamson, to be introducing a category of 
knowledge that bears traits of both a priori and a posteriori knowledge. However, 
there is an important difference which may help us to better understand Kneale. 
Experience plays an enabling – albeit not a merely enabling – role in knowledge of 
metaphysical propositions, for, according to Kneale, it is only through experience that 
we can grasp their non-logical constituents. But whereas for Williamson experience 
does not play a properly evidential role in modal knowledge – because it contributes 
by improving our imaginative capacities – I contend that for Kneale it does. How do 
we come to know that scarlet is more like pink than yellow? We experience colours 
and their relations. How do we come to know tense rules such as Rule 1 and 4? We 
directly experience temporal relations, and thereby come to have knowledge of the 
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temporal structure of the world. So, when it comes to knowledge of metaphysical 
propositions, one and the same experience is both enabling – in allowing us to 
acquire the relevant concepts – and evidential – in providing the evidence required 
for knowledge. In such cases, evidential role should trump enabling role, for it seems 
wrong to describe a case of knowing that p on the basis of a direct empirical 
experience providing evidence for p as a case of a priori knowledge.  
  To sum up: metaphysical propositions are metaphysically necessary and 
general (not existential). They can only be grasped and known via particular 
empirical experience (they have ostensive definitions). As a consequence, they are 
not knowable a priori. That they require ostensive definition explains why their 
contradictories are inconceivable; their contradictories go against the (ostensive) 
meaning of the terms. But this does not render the propositions themselves 
knowable a priori, for the reasons canvassed above. All this being so, the necessity 
of metaphysical propositions is not to be explained in terms of analyticity or verbal 
definition, which would allow them to be a priori, but must rather be explained in 
terms of something to do with aspects of the world that we can only access through 
direct experience.  
Before exploring the more obvious comparison with Kripke, it is worth pausing 
to note that something similar to Kneale’s view has appeared more recently, in 
Lowe’s work on modal epistemology (although he professes to be ‘somewhat 
sceptical about the very idea of a posteriori necessary truths’ (Lowe 2012: 920)). 
Lowe takes metaphysical necessity to have its source in the essences of things, 
where to give the real definition of a thing is to reveal its essence (Lowe 2012: 939, 
941). As is standard, real definition is contrasted with verbal definition (A.K.A. 
nominal definition): real definition is ‘a definition of a thing’; nominal definition is ‘a 
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definition of a word or phrase’ (Lowe 2012: 935). However, Lowe also introduces 
ostensive real definition. That is, some things, such as colours, can only be defined 
ostensively. 
 
I think we can provide red with an ostensive real definition. I can point to a 
colour-sample and say ‘red is this colour’. (Lowe 2012: 942). 
 
When it comes to our knowledge of a necessary truth about colour, in particular, that 
a uniformly coloured surface is not at once both red and green, he thus writes: 
 
In grasping what red is and what green is, by grasping ostensive real 
definitions of them, we thereby also grasp their mutual exclusivity, and thus 
that what is red is necessarily not green. There is no formal logical deduction 
of this available … But, I suggest, we can still infer, with equal assurance, 
from appropriate ostensive real definitions of red and green, that no uniformly 
coloured surface can have both of these colours simultaneously. (Lowe 2012: 
943). 
 
But for the specification of real, rather than nominal, definition, this could almost be 
taken from Kneale’s paper. How significant is that difference? It is important not to 
confuse the distinction between real definitions of things and nominal definitions of 
words. However, remember that Kneale is concerned not only with words, but with 
the propositions that sentences made up of words express, and with the constituents 
of those propositions. We have seen that it is reasonable to interpret Kneale as 
taking propositional constituents to be worldly, in which case, definitions of those 
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constituents will after all be definitions of things (not words), and thereby functionally 
equivalent to real definitions. Hence, Kneale anticipates something similar to Lowe’s 
modal epistemology. What Kneale lacks, however, is a developed account of the 
source of metaphysical necessity in the essences of things.  
 
4. Kneale and Kripke 
There are two features of Kripke’s view that are particularly salient for comparison. 
First, Kripke argues against a descriptivist theory of names and natural kind terms. 
He argues that the meanings of terms such as “Hesperus” and “water” are not to be 
understood as equivalent to descriptions such as “The evening star” and “The clear 
liquid that runs in rivers…”. On the contrary, these expressions are rigid designators 
(Kripke 1981: 49). As a consequence of this, certain sentences fail to be analytic and 
necessary, such as “Hesperus is the evening star”, and others are necessary even 
though they are neither analytic nor a priori, such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” and 
“Water is H2O” (Kripke 1981: 102-105). Second, the explanation of these necessities 
has something to do with the things that are referred to – Venus, water – rather than 
analyticity of the sentences used to express them. For example, it is necessary that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus because Venus is necessarily self-identical; in the actual 
world both “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” happen to refer to Venus, and so 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus” expresses a necessity. As Kripke puts it, ‘the planet 
Venus is the planet Venus and it doesn’t matter what any other person has said in 
this other possible world’ (1981: 102): it doesn’t matter if in some other world some 
other person uses the names “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” differently; all that 




 These features of Kripke’s view are not quite the same as, but correspond 
strikingly to, key features of Kneale’s view. Kneale endorses an account of the 
meanings of certain terms that takes them to have ostensive definitions rather than 
verbal definitions. This corresponds to Kripke’s rejection of a descriptivist theory of 
names. The targets are different: Kripke is writing about names and natural kind 
terms; Kneale is writing about terms corresponding to certain structures in the world, 
such as tenses and colour terms. But in both cases the thought that such terms 
could be given a definition using more words is rejected. 
 The second point of comparison is that, having moved away from a certain 
kind of linguistic explanation of the necessities under consideration, both Kneale and 
Kripke turn towards an explanation of the necessities in terms of the things 
themselves. Again, specifics are importantly different – Kripke appeals to facts about 
identity and essence, Kneale appeals to certain structures and relations between 
qualities – but in both cases it is these things, such as the identity of Venus, or the 
colour structure, that play a crucial role in determining the necessities. Given the 
story each tells about the kinds of propositions or sentences we can use to represent 
these necessities, we cannot access the necessities via analysis of the 
propositions’/sentences’ meaning. For Kneale, the relevant propositions contain 
ostensively defined constituents, which one can only grasp if one has certain direct 
experiences, and which are not analysable. For Kripke, the relevant sentences 
contain rigid designators which do not contain or entail a description, and so are also 
not analysable. In both cases, the only way to come to know the necessity is to have 
a particular experience: one needs to experience the colours; one needs to show 
empirically that the heavenly body shining in the morning is the very same thing as 
the heavenly body shining in the evening.   
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One should not also say: in both cases, the only way to grasp the content of 
the proposition or sentence is to have a particular experience. For Kneale, one must 
experience the colours, not only to learn about necessary colour structures, but even 
to grasp colour terms at all. Not so for Kripke. Although he eschews giving a full, 
positive theory of reference (1981: 93), he does sketch some options for how the 
reference of a rigid designator might be fixed and passed on. For example, ostension 
might be used, or one might use a contingent description to initially pick something 
out that would then be rigidly designated even once that description becomes false 
(Kripke 1981: 96). What one means by a name or term further down the line may 
then depend on causal-historical links between that use of the expression and that 
initial ‘baptism’ (Kripke 1981: 95). For Kneale, the same direct experience that allows 
one to grasp the terms also allows one to learn the necessities. For Kripke, the kind 
of experience that allows one to learn the necessities is distinct from the kind of 
engagement in the causal history of the use of a term that allows one to grasp the 
sentences expressing the necessities. This, then, goes some way to showing the 
additional step that Kripke took. Kneale saw a way to decouple metaphysical 
necessity and a priority, but her account of the meanings of the crucial terms is still 
to a certain extent tied up with the knowledge of those necessities: grasping their 
meaning and learning the necessities both involve the same direct empirical 
experience. Kripke goes further, in completely disconnecting our understanding of a 
necessity such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ from our knowledge of it. 
Interestingly enough, Kripke does briefly discuss colour. He suggests that the 
reference of ‘yellow’ may be fixed by a certain kind of sensory experience, but that it 
should not be taken to be synonymous with a description of such an experience 
(likewise, Lowe 2012: 942). For things could be yellow without us experiencing them, 
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or if we had had very different sensory capacities such that we no longer had the 
same kind of experience when presented with yellow things. 
 
The proper account, on the present conception is, of course, that the 
reference of ‘yellowness’ is fixed by the description ‘that (manifest) property of 
objects which causes them, under normal circumstances, to be seen as 
yellow (i.e., to be sensed by certain visual impressions)’; ‘yellow’, of course, 
does not mean ‘tends to produce such and such a sensation’; if we had had 
different neural structures, if atmospheric conditions had been different, if we 
had been blind, and so on, then yellow objects would have done no such 
thing. (Kripke 1981: 140, note 71) 
 
This brings out nicely the difference from Kneale. Both agree that ‘yellow’ lacks a 
verbal definition. Kneale (and Berlin) argue that it has an ostensive definition. They 
don’t take a verbal description of a certain sensory experience to be the definition of 
‘yellow’, but such an experience is nevertheless definitive of it in some sense. Kripke 
takes the experience they took for an ostensive definition to be a case of reference-
fixing. 
 It is also illuminating to compare Kneale and Kripke on uninstantiated terms. 
Kripke presents an argument concerning unicorns.  
 
It is said that though we have all found out that there are no unicorns, of 
course there might have been unicorns. Under certain circumstances there 
would have been unicorns. And this is an example of something I think is not 
the case. Perhaps according to me the truth should not be put in terms of 
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saying that it is necessary that there should be no unicorns, but just that we 
can’t say under what circumstances there would have been unicorns. (1981: 
24) 
 
Just as tigers are an actual species, so the unicorns are a mythical species. 
Now tigers … cannot be defined simply in terms of their appearance; it is 
possible that there should have been a different species with all the external 
appearances of tigers but which had a different internal structure and 
therefore was not the species of tigers. … Now there is no actual species of 
unicorns, and regarding the several distinct hypothetical species, with different 
internal structures (some reptilic, some mammalian, some amphibious), which 
would have the external appearances postulated to hold of unicorns in the 
myth of the unicorn, one cannot say which of these distinct mythical species 
would have been the unicorns. If we suppose, as I do, that the unicorns of the 
myth were supposed to be a particular species, but that the myth provides 
insufficient information about their internal structure to determine a unique 
species, then there is no actual or possible species of which we can say that it 
would have been the species of unicorns. (1981: 156-7) 
 
We might interpret Kripke as follows. A term such as ‘tiger’ acquires its meaning 
through association with some sample of a kind, say, a tiger. A tiger is a mammal. 
Hence ‘tiger’ refers to a particular species of mammal. ‘Unicorn’ purports to be a kind 
term also referring to an animal species. But there are no unicorns, hence there is no 
sample of the kind – no unicorn – to fix a reference for the term. Now, of course we 
could cook up a descriptive meaning, such as ‘horse-like animal with a single 
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forehead horn’, but then ‘unicorn’ would no longer be a natural kind term analogous 
to ‘tiger’ or ‘horse’. But if what ‘unicorn’ refers to must, instead, be fixed by some 
relation – perhaps using ostension or a contingent description – to an actual token of 
the kind, then it has no reference, and it is not possible for us, in our actual world, to 
properly express the possibility that there might have been unicorns. It is thereby 
indeterminate what kind of thing a unicorn would be, hence we cannot know one way 
or another whether there might have been unicorns, because we don’t know what it 
would be for there to be unicorns.6 
 Compare Kneale on uninstantiated metaphysical propositions.  
 
[Metaphysical propositions] do not themselves entail anything about the 
instantiation of their terms. It seems possible, therefore, that there may be 
true metaphysical propositions, the terms of which have no instantiation and 
about which, therefore, we know nothing. On the other hand, it is conceivable 
that the terms of the metaphysical propositions we do know should not have 
instantiation. In that case the metaphysical propositions might be said to have 
no application. For example, in a static universe the propositions concerning 
the becoming true and false of propositions would have no application, and, in 
a universe in which there was no colour, Mr. Berlin's metaphysical 
propositions about the relations of colour would have no application. (Kneale 
1938: 265) 
 
For Kneale, propositions about temporal and colour relations depend upon ostensive 
definition of instantiated qualities and relations. Kneale argues that had we lived in a 
                                                          
6 Dummett disagrees (1996: Chapter 14). See Reimer (1997) for discussion. 
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world without time or colour, we would not have known anything of the necessary 
propositions about time and colour, because they would have had no application, 
and hence we would have had no means to come to know them. Again, Kripke’s 
argument is different, but in the same spirit: given that we live in a world without 
unicorns, we can’t know any metaphysical propositions about unicorns (e.g., that 
they are mammals, or reptiles, or whatever), because the term ‘unicorn’ has no 
application, so there are no instances to determine, or to show us, what a unicorn is. 
 So, Kripke and Kneale are similar. But does Kripke’s view constitute a wholly 
positive advance? Kneale and Kripke both separate the necessary from the a priori. 
Kripke’s additional decoupling of the grasping and knowing of metaphysical 
necessities is also a crucially important philosophical innovation. However, there is at 
least one respect in which Kneale’s view – lacking this latter distinction – arguably 
does better.  
Conceivability accounts in modal epistemology have a long and rich history. 
This history is also a chequered one, insofar as substantial questions have been 
raised against such accounts.7 One key issue concerns the relation between 
conceivability and modality: why suppose that what we are able to conceive of bears 
any useful relation to what there can and can’t be? If one takes metaphysical 
modality to have its source in conceptual connections, and takes conceivability to be 
constrained by those same conceptual connections, then there is a (relatively) easy 
answer to that question available. But if one takes metaphysical modality to have its 
source in things – independent of how we think of them – the question has 
considerable bite. One might retort that if one favours the latter kind of view, then 
one ought to reject conceivability-based modal epistemologies. But such a rejection 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., Gendler and Hawthorne (2002), Vaidya (2017). 
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is not so straightforward. For one thereby incurs the challenge to come up with 
something better. And it is not as easy to get away from conceivability as might first 
appear. For example, if one takes metaphysical necessity to have its source in the 
essences of things, one might take knowledge of necessity also to depend upon 
knowledge of essence, but whence knowledge of essence? In at least some cases, 
the answer seems to revert back to conceivability. For example, for Wiggins (2001) 
(in particular p.121) the essence of something x and our ability to conceive of x in 
counterfactual scenarios are closely entwined. In short: we might take conceivability 
approaches to modal epistemology to be a pretty compelling default.  
In section 2, I noted that Kneale appeals to the principle that if it is necessary 
that p, then it is inconceivable that not-p. But she not only appeals to this principle; 
she has the resources to defend it, and thereby to show how conceivability-based 
modal epistemologies can be made compatible with the view that metaphysical 
modality has its source in mind-independent reality. She can explain the 
inconceivability of metaphysical impossibilities, because metaphysical necessity is 
still in some way connected with meaning: although a metaphysical impossibility is 
not a contradiction, it still violates the meanings of the terms in an important way, 
given that the meanings of those terms are connected by ostension to the natures of 
the things they are about. 
 Wright (2002: 2018) has argued that Kripke was also, surprisingly, committed 
to a counter-conceivability principle. In cases where the negation of some putative 
metaphysical necessity, such as that water is H2O, appears to be perfectly 
conceivable, Kripke suggests that it is really something else that is similar of which 
we are conceiving. Conceiving of the negation of a metaphysical necessity proper is 




Kripke’s response to protect the necessity of true identifications of the relevant 
kind from the depredations of apparently lucid counter-conceivings is to insist 
on a distinction between conceiving of X not being F and conceiving of an 
epistemic counterpart of X not being F. Something which presents as water in 
all (surface) respects covered by our pre-theoretic conception of water—the 
indicators that, prior to the scientific investigation, we would use to classify a 
sample as one of water—need be no more than an epistemic counterpart of 
water. (Wright 2018: 269-70) 
 
It remains a mystery, for the Kripkean, why we should not be able genuinely to 
conceive of metaphysical impossibilities, hence this appeal to counter-conceivability 
looks suspect. Surely Kripke should say something more like:   
 
when it is metaphysical possibility that is at issue, why not just recognize that 
some metaphysical impossibilities may be perfectly lucidly conceivable—
precisely because the impossibilities concerned are not grounded in the first 
place (purely) in our concepts of the events, states, or stuffs, etc. concerned? 
(Wright 2018: 279). 
 
Without further argument, Kripke’s appeal to a conceivability principle is unjustified, 
for he allows no connection between what we grasp when we understand his a 
posteriori necessities and our knowledge of them. 
In sum, Kneale separates metaphysical necessity and the a priori, but not so 
far as to also separate the conditions under which we can grasp and know 
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necessities. This leaves room for a connection between necessity and conceivability. 
Her view also moves away from a conventionalism according to which necessity – 
and our knowledge of it – is connected to merely verbal and linguistic conventions. 
Thus, her view offers an attractive balance between a robust grounding of 
metaphysical necessity in the world, and a long-standing and continually compelling 
connection between modality and conceivability. Kripke takes that more robust 
grounding of metaphysical necessity further, in also separating our grasp of 
necessities from our knowledge of them. This has the downside of – at least prima 
facie – ruling out conceivability as an option in our modal epistemology. It also 
causes problems where Kripke’s own arguments appear to depend upon a counter-
conceivability principle. It remains for the Kripkean either to defend the use of such a 
principle in Kripkean context, or to reshape the relevant arguments, and the 
epistemology, so they no longer rely upon it. 
*** 
In contrast to the usual story, I have argued that the necessary a posteriori appears 
in the work of Martha Kneale, in the 1930s. Therefore, in an account of the history of 
our changing understanding of metaphysical necessity and its relation to a priori 
knowledge, Kneale should be recognised as a landmark figure. Moreover, I have 
argued that Kneale’s view may also provide a template for a reconciliation of 
traditional conceivability-based modal epistemologies, and the post-Kripkean trend 
for taking the source of metaphysical necessities to be in mind-independent 
empirical reality.8 
                                                          
8 Thank you to audiences in Bristol and London, to Mike Beaney, Sarah Sawyer, 
Mark Textor, and to two anonymous referees, for helpful comments on previous 
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